The problem of private information retrieval with private side information (PIR-PSI) is recently introduced by Kadhe et al. In this problem, N replicated databases each store K messages, of which M are known to the user as side-information. The identity of these M messages is unknown to the databases. The user wishes to retrieve, as efficiently as possible, a new desired message without revealing any information about the joint indices of the desired and sideinformation messages. We show that the capacity of PIR-PSI is 1 +
Introduction
Originating in computer science and cryptography [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] , the Private Information Retrieval (PIR) problem has recently attracted much attention in information theory for its capacity characterizations under various constraints [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] [16] [17] [18] [19] . Most relevant to our present purpose are works on the capacity of PIR from replicated databases when some side information is available to the user [20] [21] [22] . This class of problems includes various assumptions, e.g., whether the side information is coded or uncoded, whether it is comprised of messages or symbols, whether it is known or unknown to the databases, and whether or not the privacy of the side-information must be preserved. In [20] , Tandon found the capacity of cache-aided PIR where the side information is comprised of arbitrary coded symbols and is also known to the databases. The case where side information is comprised of uncoded symbols, and is unknown to the databases, but its privacy is not required is studied by Wei, Banawan and Ulukus in [21] . Kadhe et al. in [22] studied the capacity of PIR when side information is comprised of uncoded messages that are unknown to the databases, both with and without privacy requirements for the side-information. This work is motivated by an open problem highlighted in [22] -the capacity of PIR with private side-information.
PIR with private side information (PIR-PSI) refers to the following setting. There are K messages replicated across N databases, and there is a user who has M of these messages available as side-information. The databases are not aware of the identity of these M messages. The user wants to retrieve a new message from the databases, as efficiently as possible, while preserving the joint privacy of both his desired message index as well as the indices of the M messages available to him as side-information. The capacity of PIR-PSI, denoted as C PIR-PSI (K, M, N ), is the maximum number of bits of desired information that can be retrieved per bit of downloaded information from all databases. Kadhe et al. showed that the capacity of PIR-PSI for the case of N = 1 database is given by C PIR-PSI (K, M, 1) = (K − M ) −1 . For N > 1 databases Kadhe et al. noted that the capacity characterization remains an open problem. In fact, the problem seems wide open since no inner or outer bounds are presented for N > 1 in [22] . In this work, we settle this question. We characterize the capacity of PIR-PSI as follows.
Thus, the capacity of PIR-PSI is the same as the capacity of PIR when the number of messages is reduced from
is the capacity of PIR as shown by Sun and Jafar in [9] . The capacity achieving scheme for PIR-PSI is virtually identical to the capacity achieving scheme of PIR that was introduced in [9] . The main distinction is that because of the side-information available to the user, some of the symbols to be downloaded from each database are already known to the user. The crucial observation is that the presence of this side-information allows the reduction of the number of downloaded bits, without compromising the privacy of the side-information. To appreciate this fact, suppose the user needs to download three symbols, T 1 , T 1 , T 3 from a database, and he already knows one of these symbols. If the user only asks for the other two symbols directly then he would reveal to the database that he knows the remaining symbol, i.e., the privacy of side-information would be lost. However, by downloading only two symbols, T 1 + T 3 , T 2 + T 3 , and using the symbol that he already knows, the user is able to recover all of T 1 , T 2 , T 3 without disclosing his side-information to the database. This is because given any one symbol out of T 1 , T 2 , T 3 the other two symbols can be recovered from T 1 +T 3 , T 2 +T 3 . In general, if in the original PIR scheme of [9] the user needs to download p symbols from a database, and because of the side-information he already knows q of these symbols, then by downloading only p − q linear combinations of the p symbols, and eliminating the q symbols that are already known to the user from these equations, he obtains p − q equations in p − q variables from which he can recover all the symbols that he needs for the original PIR scheme. Sufficiently generic equations required for this purpose can be obtained, e.g., by downloading only the p − q non-systematic symbols of a systematic (2p−q, p) MDS code applied to the p symbols. Remarkably, with this idea, and a proper accounting for p and q as functions of K, M, N , the achievability of C PIR-PSI (K, M, N ) is established. The converse for this problem is also essentially inherited from the original converse provided by Sun and Jafar in [9] .
Notation:
Maximum distance separable codes are referred to as MDS codes. F represents a finite field.
PIR-PSI and its Capacity
There are N databases and each database stores all the K messages W 1 , · · · , W K . To denote the side information available to the user, let
S is not known to the databases. The user generates a desired message index θ privately and uniformly from [K]\S. Note the following independence.
The goal is to retrieve W θ as efficiently as possible while revealing no information about (θ, S) to any database. In order to retrieve W θ , the user generates N queries Q 
Upon receiving the answers from all the N databases and using the side-information W S , the user must be able to decode the desired message W θ , subject to probability of error P e which must approach zero as the size of each message L approaches infinity. This is called the 'correctness' constraint. From Fano's inequality, we have
where o(L) represents any function such that lim L→∞ o(L)/L = 0. PIR-PSI requires that the joint privacy of (θ, S) must be preserved against each of the databases, 1 i.e., I(θ, S; Q
where the notation A ∼ B means that A and B are identically distributed. For any scheme that satisfies the correctness and privacy constraints, the achievable rate characterizes how many bits of desired information are retrieved per downloaded bit, and is defined as follows.
where D is the expected total number of bits downloaded by the user from all the databases. The supremum of achievable rates R is called capacity. For the PIR-PSI problem the capacity is denoted by C PIR-PSI (K, M, N ). The main result of this work is the characterization of C PIR-PSI (K, M, N ), presented in the following theorem.
Theorem 1 The capacity of the PIR-PSI problem is
3 Proof of Theorem 1: Achievability
An achievable scheme for PIR-PSI with parameters (K, M, N ) is constructed as follows. First, start with the achievable scheme of regular PIR with parameters (K, N ), from [9] . For each database, let p denote the number of symbols to be downloaded in the original PIR scheme. Out of these p symbols, let q denote the number of symbols that are already known to the user based on his side information. For each database, use a systematic MDS(2p − q, p) code to encode the p symbols into 2p − q symbols of which p are systematic, and download only the other p − q symbols corresponding to the non-systematic part. Let us illustrate this with a simple example.
PIR-PSI with
Suppose there are 2 databases and 3 messages, one of which is known to the user as side-information. We start with the achievable scheme of regular PIR from [9] for K = 3 messages and N = 2 databases, i.e., the downloads from the two databases are represented below. All the symbols and coefficients are from a finite field F that is large enough so that a systematic MDS(13, 7) code exists over F.
Note that in the regular PIR setting, the rate achieved by this scheme is C PIR (3, 2) = 4/7 (which is also the capacity in the absence of side-information. This is because the user recovers 8 desired symbols from a total of 14 downloaded symbols (7 from each database). Note that p = 7, i.e., the user downloads 7 symbols from each database.
However, in the PIR-PSI setting, the user knows W 3 , which means he already knows the c i symbols. Consider DB1, and note that q = 1, i.e., the user already knows c 1 , so he only needs the remaining p − q = 6 symbols from DB1. So the user asks each database to encode the 7 symbols with a systematic MDS(13, 7) code and downloads only the 6 linear combinations corresponding to the non-systematic part. Since the user already knows c 1 , along with the 6 downloaded symbols, this gives him 7 symbols of the MDS code, from which he can recover all 7 symbols of the original PIR scheme. For example, the user could download from DB1 DB1 α 11 u 1 + α 12 u 2 + α 13 u 3 + α 14 u 4 + α 15 u 5 + α 16 u 6 + α 17 u 7 α 21 u 1 + α 22 u 2 + α 23 u 3 + α 24 u 4 + α 25 u 5 + α 26 u 6 + α 27 u 7 α 31 u 1 + α 32 u 2 + α 33 u 3 + α 34 u 4 + α 35 u 5 + α 36 u 6 + α 37 u 7 α 41 u 1 + α 42 u 2 + α 43 u 3 + α 44 u 4 + α 45 u 5 + α 46 u 6 + α 47 u 7 α 51 u 1 + α 52 u 2 + α 53 u 3 + α 54 u 4 + α 55 u 5 + α 56 u 6 + α 57 u 7 α 61 u 1 + α 62 u 2 + α 63 u 3 + α 64 u 4 + α 65 u 5 + α 66 u 6 + α 67 u 7 instead of (u 1 , u 2 , u 3 , u 4 , u 5 , u 6 , u 7 ) where (u 1 , u 2 , u 3 , u 4 , u 5 , u 6 , u 7 ) = (a 1 , b 1 , c 1 , a 3 + b 2 , a 4 + c 2 , b 3 + c 3 , a 7 + b 4 + c 4 ), and α ij , u j are from F.
Achievability for arbitrary (K, M, N)
To avoid repetition we will follow the notation of Sun and Jafar from [9] , since the achievable scheme is essentially the same. Thus, U j = (u j (1), u j (2), · · · , u j (L)) represents a random permutation of the symbols from message W j and the terminology k-sum denotes an expression representing the sum of k distinct symbols, each drawn from a different message, e.g.,
For the regular PIR scheme of [9] , the response from each database is comprised of K disjoint subsets called "blocks", that are indexed by k ∈ [K]. Block k contains only k-sums. Note that there are only K k possible "types" of k-sums. Block k contains (N − 1) k−1 distinct instances of each type of k-sum, so the total number of elements contained in block k is K k (N − 1) k−1 . Therefore, the total number of symbols to be downloaded from each database is p =
The next step is to calculate, out of these p symbols, how many are already known to the user based on his side-information. Suppose the user previously knows the M messages
Thus the user knows all symbols that are comprised of only linear combinations of symbols from these M messages. In terms of block k (k ≤ M ), the user knows all terms of types
So the total number of symbols known to the user corresponding to each database is q =
The user specifies a systematic MDS(2p − q, p) code (any such code suffices) and asks each database to encode its p symbols with this MDS code and return only the p − q symbols corresponding to the non-systematic part.
Note that the user does not need to know the realization of S, W S in order to construct the queries. This is because the MDS code does not depend on S, W S . During the decoding, S and W S are only used after the answers from the databases are collected. Therefore, the privacy of this PIR-PSI scheme is inherited from the privacy of the original PIR scheme. Correctness follows from the MDS property because in addition to the p − q downloaded symbols the user provides the q symbols that he already knows, to obtain a total of p symbols from the MDS code. Since any p symbols from an MDS code suffice to recover the original p symbols, the user recovers the same p symbols as in the original PIR scheme of [9] . Then the correctness is inherited from the correctness of the original PIR scheme. All that remains is to calculate the rate achieved by this scheme.
Recall that p can be simplified as,
Using the same method we can simplify q,
The size of each message in the original PIR scheme of [9] is N K symbols, therefore the rate,
4 Proof of Theorem 1: Converse
Before presenting the general converse, let us start with a simple example for ease of exposition. 
Converse for PRI-PSI with
where (30) holds because W 2 is independent of (Q 
Similarly,
Adding (32) and (33) we have ) one can recover W 3 with vanishing probability of error. This gives us the bound on the rate of PIR-PSI with (K, M, N ) = (3, 1, 2) as
Converse for PIR-PSI with arbitrary (K, M, N)
For compact notation, let us define
If M = K − 1, then the capacity is 1 which is trivial. So we will assume that M < K − 1. Without loss of generality, suppose the user knows W S = {W 1 , · · · , W M }, S = {1, · · · , M } as side information and wishes to retrieve W M +1 . The total download is bounded as,
= H(A 
Similarly, for all n ∈ [2 : N ] we have,
Adding all of these N inequalities we obtain,
Proceeding along the lines of the original recursive proof of Sun and Jafar for PIR [9] , we have,
where D S (K, K) = 0. Therefore,
= L(1 + 1
This gives us the bound on the rate of PIR-PSI as 
Conclusion
The capacity of private information retrieval with private side information is characterized, settling an open problem highlighted by Kadhe et al. recently in [22] . Both achievability and converse proofs are essentially inherited from [9] .
